A look into case law on the subject

By Malcolm Lee Kitchen III | MK3 Law Group
(c) 2026 – All rights reserved.

Domestic Violence actually is, as it is written in law, it is about “invasion”, an attempt to “overthrow” our form of government, which is exactly what Congress has done in 1994 and the reauthorization act of 2005 by redefining domestic violence, which the people and/or Congress have no authority to alter and creating the Violence Against Women Act, VAWA, an “usurpation of power” which is a declared act of a tyrant, our declared “enemy” in the Declaration of Independence July 4, 1776.

It is the conduct and characteristics of a tyrant that makes them our enemy. Which giving aid to our enemies is Treason. “He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation:” Then a few other declared acts of tyranny, This SMU, “Civil Process” when it is “criminal in nature” and is supposed to follow the criminal process under criminal law, assault/battery, but goes through “Family law”, “Family Court/Juvenile Court” deprives one of the most basic fundamental rights of due process of law “For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury;” as no man shall be deprived of Life, Liberty or Property with the CONSENT of a Lawful Jury.

More importantly the right of Jury Nullification. “He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.” by creating “Police Forces”, “Social Workers”, “Child Protection Services” (CPS), which are “standing armies”, “He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.” Which they receive their “wages”, “Emoluments” that end up paying for their homes, “For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us;” and at the end of a barrel of a gun take our Children, Fathers/Mothers, Husbands/Wives and other Family members by force and violence and sometimes even murder them. “For protecting them, by a mock trial, from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these states;” then protect the murders/batterers from any punishment by doing “internal investigations” and they are most often not punished and our complaints are discarded.

It’s like the “fox guarding the hen house”. Furthermore, pursuant to the “Protection Order” the “Right of the people to keep and bear arms” is arbitrarily taken away without due process of law, a Bill of Attainder/Bill of Pain and Penalty which is a Right that cannot be taken away, as it is a Natural Right as part of the Law of Nature to defend our Life, Liberty, Property and the Pursuit of Happiness, not only from criminals, but from a tyrannical form of government, fundamentally and principally in accordance with the American Common Law, the Law of Nature and the Supreme Law of the Land which prohibits ANY infringement of any of our private rights. Government was not instituted to dictate to the people what our rights are and how we exercise them, in fact it was instituted to SECURE these rights from a despotic government.

Commentaries on the Constitution, Book 3 Chapter XLI. Pgs. 677-678. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States of America, Joseph Story. 1833

GUARANTY OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT MODE OF MAKING AMENDMENTS.

§ 953. The fourth section of the fourth article is as follows: “ The United States shall guaranty to every “ state in this Union a republican form of government;

“ and shall protect each of them against invasion; and

“ on application of the legislature, or of the executive,

“ when the legislature cannot be convened, against

“ domestic violence.”

§ 954. The want of a provision of this nature was felt, as a capital defect in the plan of the confederation, as it might in its consequences endanger, if not overthrow, the Union. Without a guaranty, the assistance to be derived from the national government in repelling domestic dangers, which might threaten the existence of the state constitutions, could not be demanded, as a right, from the national government. Usurpation might raise its standard, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more, than behold the encroachments with indignation and regret. A successful faction might erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and law ; while no succor could be constitutionally afforded by the Union to the friends and supporters of the government. But this is not all. The destruction of the national government itself, or of neighboring states, might result from a successful rebellion in a single state. Who can determine, what would have been the issue, if the insurrection in Massachusetts, in 1787, had been successful, and the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or a Cromwell? If a despotic or monarchical government were established in one state, it would bring on the ruin of the whole republic. Montesquieu has acutely remarked, that confederated governments should be formed only between states, whose form of government is not only similar, but also republican.

From the Annotated Constitution Source: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-conan/article-4/section-4/guarantee-of-republican-form-of-government

GUARANTEE OF REPUBLICAN FORM OF GOVERNMENT

The first clause of this section, in somewhat different language, was contained in the Virginia Plan introduced in the Convention and was obviously attributable to Madison.(333) Through the various permutations into its final form, the object of the clause seems clearly to have been more than an authorization for the Federal Government to protect states against foreign invasion or internal insurrection,(335) a power seemingly already conferred in any case.(336) No one can now resurrect the full meaning of the clause and intent which moved the Framers to adopt it, but with the exception of the reliance for a brief period during Reconstruction the authority contained within the confines of the clause has been largely unexplored. (337)

In Luther v. Borden,(338) the Supreme Court established the doctrine that questions arising under this section are political, not judicial, in character and that “it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State . . . as well as its republican character.” (339) Texas v. White (340) held that the action of the President in setting up provisional governments at the conclusion of the war was justified, if at all, only as an exercise of his powers as Commander-in-Chief and that such governments were to be regarded merely as provisional regimes to perform the functions of government pending action by Congress. On the ground that the issues were not justiciable, the Court in the early part of this century refused to pass on a number of challenges to state governmental reforms and thus made the clause in effect noncognizable by the courts in any matter,(341) a status from which the Court’s opinion in Baker v. Carr,(342) despite its substantial curbing of the political question doctrine, did not release it.(343)

Similarly, in Luther v. Borden,(344) the Court indicated that it rested with Congress to determine the means proper to fulfill the guarantee of protection to the states against domestic violence. Chief Justice Taney declared that Congress might have placed it in the power of a court to decide when the contingency had happened that required the Federal Government to interfere, but that instead Congress had by the act of February 28, 1795,(345) authorized the President to call out the militia in case of insurrection against the government of any state.

It followed, said Taney, that the President “must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the duty imposed upon him by the act of Congress,”346 which determination was not subject to review by the courts.

In recent years, the authority of the United States to use troops and other forces in the states has not generally been derived from this clause and it has been of little importance.

Footnotes

333 “Resd. that a Republican government . . . ought to be guaranteed by the United States to each state.” 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

334 Thus, on June 11, the language of the provision was on Madison’s motion changed to: “Resolved that a republican constitution and its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States.” 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 193–194, 206 (rev. ed. 1937). Then, on July 18, Gouverneur Morris objected to this language on the ground that “[h]e should be very unwilling that such laws as exist in R. Island ought to be guaranteed to each State of the Union.” 2 id. at 47. Madison then suggested language “that the Constitutional authority of the States shall be guaranteed to them respectively against domestic as well as foreign violence,” whereas Randolph wanted to add to this the language “and that no State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt.” Wilson then moved, “as a better expression of the idea,” almost the present language of the section, which was adopted. Id. at 47–49. [Back to text]

335 Thus, Randolph on June 11, supporting Madison’s version pending then, said that “a republican government must be the basis of our national union; and no state in it ought to have it in their power to change its government into a monarchy.” 1 id. at 206. Again, on July 18, when Wilson and Mason indicated their understanding that the object of the proposal was “merely” to protect states against violence, Randolph asserted: “The Resoln. has 2 Objects. 1. to secure Republican government. 2. to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of both these provisions.” 2 id. at 47. Following speakers alluded to the dangers of monarchy being created peacefully as necessitating the provision. Id. at 48. See W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (1972).

336 See Article I, § 8, cl. 15.

337 See generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).

338 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).

339 48 U.S. at 42.

340 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1869). In Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1868), the state attempted to attack Reconstruction legislation on the premise that it already had a republican form of government and that Congress was thus not authorized to act. The Court viewed the congressional decision as determinative. [Back to text]

341 Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Davis v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Ohio v. Akron Park Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). But in certain earlier cases the Court had disposed of Guarantee Clause questions on the merits. Forsyth v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506 (1897); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).

342 369 U.S. 186, 218–32 (1962). In the Court’s view, Guarantee Clause questions were nonjusticiable because resolution of them had been committed to Congress and not because they involved matters of state governmental structure.

343 Subsequently, the Court, speaking through Justice O’Connor, raised without deciding the possibility that the Guarantee Clause is justiciable and is a constraint upon Congress’s power to regulate the activities of the states. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 183–85 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991). The opinions draw support from a powerful argument for using the Guarantee Clause as a judicially enforceable limit on federal power.

Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).

344 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).

345 1 Stat. 424.

346 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849).

Chadmans Cyclopedia- copyright 1912, Vol III, Principles of The Law of Torts “The law requires that before the party injured by any felonious act can seek civil redress for it, the matter should be disposed of before the proper criminal tribunal, in order that the justice of the country may be first satisfied in respect to the public offense; and after a verdict, either acquittal or conviction, a civil action may be maintained.”

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